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Abstract: Noam Chomsky’s early work was at the core of the “cognitive revolution” in the 1950s-
60s, leading to a paradigm shift from a behavioralist to a mentalistic approach to human psychology.
Central to this revolution has been the question of how infants learn language. Here, we provide an
overview of how the generative enterprise has shaped research on language acquisition over the last
decades. We argue that a large body of empirical knowledge about infants’ representation of grammar
has accumulated. Many of these questions would most likely not have been investigated empirically
without the impetus of such a mentalistic approach.
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1. Introduction
Noam Chomsky’s early work and generative linguistic theory more gener-
ally were at the core of the “cognitive revolution” in the 1950s–60s, leading
to a paradigm shift from a behavioralist to a more mentalistic approach to
human psychology. Central to cognitive science, a discipline born out of
this initial movement is the question of how human infants learn their na-
tive language(s). Here, we provide an overview of how Chomsky’s work and
the generative enterprise have shaped research on language acquisition over
the last decades. We argue that under the influence of generative grammar,
several surprising and highly relevant findings about infants’ early knowl-
edge of grammar have been revealed, many of which would most likely
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not even have been investigated empirically without the impetus of such a
mentalistic approach. We also highlight that more recently, these advances
have led to a new, integrative perspective, going beyond the original the-
oretical dichotomy of nature (nativism) vs. nurture (empiricism).
2. Language acquisition as a logical problem, innateness as a solution
The problem of accounting for language acquisition appeared very early in
Noam Chomsky’s work. In his review of Skinner’s Verbal behavior, Chom-
sky (1959) draws a parallel between the infants’ task of learning a language
and the linguist’s job of describing the grammar of an unknown language.
Both the child and the linguist need to derive a rule system from the finite
set of linguistic exemplars they encounter. This, Chomsky, argues is a log-
ical impossibility. As the induction problem, a well-known mathematical
phenomenon, suggests, for any finite dataset, there is an infinite number
of underlying rules that could generate it. It is thus impossible for the
learner to know which rule system to select as the “true” grammar of the
target language. For language acquisition, this would mean that even if
infants settled on a given grammar, there was no guarantee that any two
infants settled on the same grammar and would thus end up learning the
same language. This, of course, is contrary to empirical fact, as all typi-
cally developing infants acquire the language(s) spoken in their linguistic
community.
This “poverty of the stimulus” problem is further exacerbated be-
cause the linguistic input infants receive is noisy, containing within- and
between-speaker variation, errors, omissions, false starts etc. Even more
importantly, infants only rarely receive negative evidence (Marcus 1993),
i.e., information that a sentence or a form is not part of the grammar, i.e.,
is ungrammatical, because adults usually only correct factual or objective
mistakes in children’s speech (e.g., This is a tiger when it is actually a lion),
but not grammatical errors (e.g., Tom want chocolate) (Braine 1971). Fur-
ther, infants never receive the kind of explicit teaching about the rules of
grammar that second language learners often get.
If language cannot be learned from external input alone due to the
infinite number of possible grammars, argues Chomsky, an innate system,
a “Language Acquisition Device” needs to exist to narrow down the logical
space of possible grammars, thereby helping the infant converge on the ap-
propriate grammar. “The fact that all normal children acquire essentially
comparable grammars […] suggests that human beings are […] designed
to do this, with [a] “hypothesis-formulating” ability of unknown charac-
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ter and complexity” (Chomsky 1959, 49). This mentalistic approach went
against the behaviorist account proposed for instance in Skinner’s Verbal
behavior (Skinner 1957), which framed language learning as a stimulus-
response phenomenon, the most important learning mechanism of which
is imitation.
The innate nature of the language faculty implies that it is grounded
in our genetic endowment. This approach moves away from considering
language a cultural object that varies infinitely across populations (e.g.,
Boas 1940) and places it in the domain of human biology, universal across
our species.
The poverty of stimulus argument is not without its critiques. Pullum
and Scholz (2002), for instance, provide empirical arguments suggesting
that the infant’s input may not be as poor in relevant positive evidence as
generative linguists usually claim. One often cited example for poverty is
stimulus arguments (Crain & Nakayama 1987; Crain 1991) is the structure-
sensitivity of question formation when a complex sentence with an em-
bedded relative clause is present. It has been argued that while infants
encounter many examples of question formation for simple main clauses
(You are there → Are you there?), instances of complex cases involving
embedded relatives are rare (The dog that is in the corner is hungry → Is
the dog that is in the corner hungry?, and not *Is the dog that in the
corner is hungry?). Generativist accounts have argued that sentences of
the type Is the dog that is in the corner hungry?, constituting positive
evidence that question formation involves the main verb (main auxiliary)
and not the sequentially first one, are rare in young learners’ input, yet
children typically for these complex questions correctly from an early age
(Crain & Nakayama 1987). By contrast, Pullum and Scholz (2002) show
that such sentences do appear in the input, citing examples from literature
(e.g., William Blake’s “Tiger”: Did He who made the lamb make thee?), the
Wall Street Journal corpus, and most relevantly in the CHILDES corpus.
In general, the poverty of stimulus argument has given a strong impetus
to empirical studies of the input young learners receive. The CHILDES
corpus (MacWhinney 2000), one of the largest annotated written and au-
dio(visual) databases of infant-adult and infant-infant interactions, has to
a large extent grown out of efforts to better understand the input. Despite
this attention and the growing body of available corpus data, no definitive
empirical evidence exists to settle the issue of whether the input provides
sufficient (positive) evidence for learning. Further work in this regard is
thus needed.
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3. Formal theories of grammar and language acquisition
Chomsky has proposed several formal theories of Universal Grammar (UG;
e.g., Chomsky 1957; 1965; 1981; 1995), the innate mental system that con-
tains the logical space of all possible grammars and as such underlies all
human languages. One formalism, the Principles and Parameters model
(P&P; Chomsky 1981) offers a framework in which language acquisition is
particularly easy to operationalize. The P&P model argues that UG con-
sists of principles, universal features that characterize all human languages,
and parameters, variables often conceptualized as (binary) switches that
account for cross-linguistic variation. For instance, it is a principle of UG
that each sentence must have a subject. A classical example of a parameter
is the pro-drop or null subject parameter. In languages, e.g., Italian, Hun-
garian, in which this parameter takes a positive value, the subject of the
sentence can be a phonologically empty, null element (pro), e.g., Italian:
Piove rain.3sg ‘It rains’, whereas in languages with a negative value, e.g.,
English, French, no empty subjects are allowed (*Rains).
The P&P model readily accounts for language acquisition. Principles
raise no learning problem, as they are universal across all languages, and
they are innate. Parameters, which account for the observable variation
across languages, are the real targets of language acquisition: the learner’s
task is set the values of the parameters to the ones that characterize the
native language. This is a systematic and readily operationalizable view of
language acquisition.
However, it leaves open one question: what are the triggers for pa-
rameter setting? In other words, parameters and the linguistic variables
and categories that constitute them, such as pro, V(erb) etc., are abstract
mental entities. How does the infant know what corresponds to them in
the concrete, physical input she receives? This question was formulated by
Pinker (1984) as the “linking problem”.
Bootstrapping theories offer a possible solution. They hypothesize that
infants learn about certain abstract structural properties of their native
language using perceptually available surface cues that are correlated with
the abstract properties (Morgan & Demuth 1996). In English, for instance,
disyllabic nouns typically have initial stress, while verbs have final stress,
e.g., récord (N) vs. recórd (V). Thus the stress pattern of a word can
help infants determine its lexical category even if the word is unfamiliar
and its meaning is unknown. Several types of bootstrapping models have
been proposed on the basis of the different surface cues that infants may
use, e.g., semantic bootstrapping (Pinker 1984), syntactic bootstrapping
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(Gleitman & Landau 1994; Lidz et al. 2003), prosodic bootstrapping (Mor-
gan & Demuth 1996; Nespor 1990; Nespor et al. 2008; Gervain & Werker
2013) and frequency-based bootstrapping (Nespor et al. 2008; Bernard &
Gervain 2012). The specific contributions of each bootstrapping model will
be discussed in greater detail in section 4.2.4 below.
This nativist account of language acquisition is often contrasted in the
literature by empiricist accounts arguing that statistically-based, general
purpose or other non-linguistic, e.g., social, mechanisms can account for
language acquisition without the need to assume innate, language-specific
mental contents. It is impossible to give an exhaustive account of these
proposals here. We would, nevertheless, like to mention a few influential
and particularly relevant examples.
One tradition argues that there is enough statistical information (e.g.,
frequency of occurrence and co-occurrence of different linguistic units) in
the input to provide robust patterns, which young learners can pick up
on to learn grammar. Thus, connectionist (Elman et al. 1996) and more
recently machine learning (LeCun et al. 2015) modelers have built net-
works and algorithms that can learn structural regularities from different
linguistic inputs with high accuracy. It has also been shown experimen-
tally that very young infants are sensitive to statistical regularities in their
input, such as frequency and conditional probability cues (Saffran et al.
1996 and subsequent work). This statistical learning based account has
produced remarkable results. Very young infants have been shown to rely
on transitional probabilities for word segmentation and other linguistic
tasks under a wide variety of circumstances from the earliest ages (e.g.,
Teinonen et al. 2009; Pelucchi et al. 2009; Lany & Saffran 2010). Today’s
deep learning algorithms (LeCun et al. 2015) are able to recognize and
label large quantities of images, perform intelligent semantic searches, and
are regularly used by our web browsers and smart phones for a large vari-
ety of purposes. The accuracy of these algorithms is often very high, and
matches human performance. However, very tellingly, their errors reveal
non-human-like performance: an image categorization algorithm labeled a
sofa with a leopard fabric as a leopard. In a systematic review, Marcus
(2018) argues that while deep learning and other machine learning algo-
rithms are very powerful, they differ from human cognition in many ways,
suggesting that the underlying computational mechanisms are different.
For instance, deep learning algorithms need massive amounts of training
data, while infants can learn from few instances (e.g., they can learn a word
form and its meaning from just a single instance of exposure, a mechanism
known as zap-mapping or fast mapping). Deep learning algorithms are
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task-specific and close-ended. A network trained on image recognition will
do poorly on phoneme categorization, whereas human intelligence is flex-
ible and allows for generalizations. And most importantly for the current
discussion, these algorithms cannot handle hierarchical structure like the
one found in human syntax. Marcus (2018), therefore, suggests that the
best approach, most similar to human cognition and even more power-
ful than the current algorithms, would be to augment the current models
with symbolic representations allowing them to meet some of the chal-
lenges mentioned above.
Another empiricist approach, inspired by usage-based theories of lan-
guage processing (Bybee & Hopper 2001), argues that statistical informa-
tion in the input complemented with social learning mechanisms such as
joint attention between an infant and a caregiver in a given communicative
situation best explain language acquisition (Tomasello 2000). According to
this approach, the infant picks up common sequences from the input, with
at most one open slot in them (e.g.,Where is the ?) and can initially only
insert a limited set of items in this open slot. She then proceeds by gradu-
ally generalizing from these initially limited and item-based templates to
construct an increasingly abstract grammar. In so doing, she relies to a
large extent on her advanced social abilities, which allow her to under-
stand the intentions and thus the intended meaning of the communicative
partner (e.g., infant and caregiver are engaged in jointly attending to a toy,
and the caregiver holds it out for the infants to grab, while saying Here,
the ball!, allowing the infant to infer that ball must refer to the object being
offered). While successful at explaining some aspects of language learning,
e.g., word learning, this approach has not been able to offer an account of
how (complex) syntactic structure might be learned.
More generally, while the empiricist approaches have indeed offered
valuable insight into the mechanisms underlying learning tasks such as
lexical acquisition or the development of semantics, they remain relatively
uninformative about how syntactic structure may be learned.
4. Empirical findings inspired by generative linguistics
This mentalist and biologically based account of language acquisition pro-
posed by generativists gave rise to a new research agenda, drawing atten-
tion to some previously unstudied phenomena and revealing links between
observations hitherto believed to be unconnected. First, assuming the ex-
istence of innate mental contents pushed researchers to investigate very
young infants, including newborns and even fetuses. While the late emer-
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gence of an ability is not necessarily an argument against its innateness
(i.e., teeth or sexual maturation), its early presence, i.e., before experi-
ence and opportunities for learning occur, is strong evidence in favor of it.
Prelinguistic infants’ cognitive and linguistic abilities thus became a major
focus of interest. Second, and relatedly, since observable behavior was no
longer the only admissible source of data, studies on perception multiplied.
This was particularly relevant for studying prelinguistic infants, as their
overt behavioral repertoire is strongly limited and linguistic production
does not begin before the first birthday. The realization that prelinguis-
tic infants nevertheless possess considerable knowledge about speech and
language would not have been possible without investigating perception.
Third, the idea that language is a biological phenomenon brought about
an evolutionary perspective, with an increasing number of studies com-
paring the abilities of humans and animals. Several types of non-human
animals provide relevant comparisons. Primates are interesting as they are
our closest relatives and thus share a large part of our evolutionary history
and genetic endowment. Birds are often studied because they are vocal
communicators and as such have sophisticated vocalizations, perceptual
and vocal learning abilities. Dogs have also been increasingly compared
to humans, as they share our cultural history through domestication, and
“accept” humans in their social structure. Non-human animals are often
compared to human adults as well as to human infants. This latter com-
parison is all the more relevant, as both animals and human infants are
non-linguistic, providing a particularly close match in terms of linguistic
experience and knowledge, as well as in the experimental methods appli-
cable to them. Fourth, as another consequence of this biological perspec-
tive, neurological and brain research has also been brought to bear on
speech and language processing and even more abstractly on formal lin-
guistic theories, especially with the recent advent of brain imaging methods
(which, of course, in itself is not brought about my the generativist stance).
The empirical data available on language development has thus radi-
cally increased and diversified in the last decades, partly due to the cogni-
tive and biologically-based perspective of the generative enterprise. Below,
we review some of the most important empirical findings, asking whether
and if yes how they confirmed or infirmed the original generativist assump-
tions about language.
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4.1. Evidence for the biological basis of language from language acquisition
Research supporting the idea that language is part of our biology, and
thus obeys principles that other biological systems also show started very
early after the cognitive revolution. One of the most important findings,
proposed first by Lenneberg (1967), has been that language is a critical
period phenomenon: during the first years of life, language input allows
a child to become a native speaker of the language(s) she is exposed to.
After the closure of this window of opportunity, learners may still develop
high proficiency, but will most typically not achieve full native competence.
Early evidence for this proposal came from different sources. First, sev-
eral cases of linguistic isolates or feral children were found, who practically
received no language input due to parental neglect. Among these children
Genie and Chelsea, discovered at ages 13 and 31 years, respectively, never
developed native competence after they started receiving language input,
while Isabelle, who was found at age 6, rapidly caught up with her peers
and learned English natively (Curtiss et al. 1974; Snow 1987). One crucial
difference that may explain the different outcomes in these three cases is
the age at which these individuals started receiving typical language in-
put. Only Isabelle, the child who started learning language before the on-
set of puberty, could acquire language natively. Similar observations have
been made about second language learners (Snow & Hoefnagel-Hohle 1978;
Johnson & Newport 1989). Immigrants to the USA who arrived between
ages 3–7 years developed fluency in English that was undistinguishable
from that of infants born and raised in English-speaking American fami-
lies, while immigrants who arrived after this age showed competence that
decreased gradually with increasing age of arrival. These observations con-
firm that language is a critical or sensitive period phenomenon, similarly
to other well-documented biological phenomena such as the development
of ocular dominance in the visual cortex or imprinting in young animals.
The discovery of a critical period for language placed even more em-
phasis on the importance of acquisition for the understanding of human
language. Studies on early development, especially on children’s early pro-
duction in different languages began, documenting the fact that across
languages, young children go through approximately the same language
developmental milestones. Babbling starts around 4-6 months, the produc-
tion of the first words at 12 months, of the first two-word combinations at 2
years, and “telegraphic speech”, i.e., combinations of several content words
with some of the functors omitted, at 3 years. The fact that young children
from different cultures follow the same developmental trajectory, despite
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important differences between the grammatical and vocabulary structures
of the target languages, was also taken as evidence for the biological roots
of language.
An even more striking demonstration came from Nicaraguan sign lan-
guage (Senghas & Coppola 2001; Kegl 2002). Deaf children born to hear-
ing/speaking families typically do not receive language input as they do not
hear the speech around them, and they develop simple signs to communi-
cate, called home signs. In the 70s–80s in Nicaragua, such home signer chil-
dren were brought together in special schools. In the span of a few decades,
generations of these children developed a new, full-blown language, known
as the Nicaraguan Sign Language. Remarkably, this language emerged
without any input from an existing natural language, spoken or signed,
as the children initially did not have full language competence, only using
home sign. The fast and effortless emergence of this new sign language is
considered strong evidence that the human brain is born “language-ready”
(Kegl 2002), biologically prepared to process language, and is able to create
it, even in the face of absent or fragmentary input.
Research on the language development of blind children led to similar
conclusions. While these children are deprived of a very important source
of perceptual input about the world, and about the possible meaning of lin-
guistic communication around them, their language development is largely
unperturbed (Landau et al. 1985). This suggests again that language de-
velopment is to a large extent independent of perceptual experience and is
driven by internal biological constraints.
4.2. Research on early speech perception and language development
The above-discussed general biological principles underlying language have
highlighted the importance of early language development. Infants’ and
young children’s speech perception and language learning abilities have
started receiving much scrutiny, especially once experimental methods to
test infants under laboratory circumstances were developed in the 70s–80s.
We discuss some of the most interesting and relevant empirical findings
below. It needs to be noted that this is far from being an exhaustive review.
4.2.1. Becoming a native listener: perceptual narrowing
and phonological development
The critical period for language is best documented and closes earliest in
the phonological domain (Werker & Hensch 2015). Newborns and young
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infants are able to make almost all phonological discriminations that ex-
ist in the world’s languages, including those that are not found in the
language(s) they are learning (Eimas et al. 1971). After several months
of experience with the native language, sensitivity to non-native phono-
logical distinctions, including phoneme, tone and lexical stress contrasts,
decreases, and by the end of the second half of the first year of life, infants
become better at discriminating the contrasts found in their native lan-
guage, while unable to distinguish most, albeit not all, non-native contrasts
(Werker & Tees 1984; Kuhl 1993; Best 1994; Mattock et al. 2008; Narayan
et al. in press). Importantly, during this process, the initial perceptual
boundaries in phonological space are suppressed, maintained or sharpened
as a function of experience, but entirely new boundaries are not created.
Perceptual reorganization is accompanied by an increased brain spe-
cialization for the native language, i.e., an increasing left-lateralization, and
a gradual decrease in the neural plasticity of the brain areas involved in
speech perception (Sato et al. 2010; Minagawa-Kawai et al. 2007; Friederici
et al. 2007; Friederici 2011).
Similar narrowing is also observed in other perceptual domains, such
as face perception, anchoring speech perception development in more gen-
eral neural maturational processes (Maurer & Werker 2014; Slater et al.
2010; Watson et al. 2014).
4.2.2. Children go beyond the input in their production: evidence for abstract
structural representations
The hypothesis of an innate universal grammar predicts that children
should have abstract grammatical representations, which help them learn
grammar. Considerable empirical evidence has accumulated suggesting
that young children are indeed able to go beyond imitating the input they
receive and organize their linguistic knowledge into structure-sensitive, ab-
stract rules from their earliest productions.
One classical demonstration comes from an experimental paradigm
known as the wug-test (Berko 1958). Preschool children were shown pic-
ture cards in which a cartoon-like animal or an action performed by a
person was named using a nonsense word, obeying English phonotactic
regularities. The children were then prompted to generate the plural or
the past tense of the nonsense “nouns” and “verbs” (e.g., This is a wug.
Now there is another one. […] There are two .) Children successfully
created the expected forms (wugs) despite the fact that these were nonsense
words, which they never heard before. This confirms that young children
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have a representation of morphological rules that is sufficiently abstract to
allow generalization to a new item.
Similar results were obtained for the existence of structure-sensitive
rules in syntax (Crain & Nakayama 1987). Preschoolers, who were familiar
with the formation of yes/no questions by subject/auxiliary inversion in
English (The man is tall. → Is the man tall?), were given a sentence
elicitation task in which they had to form yes/no question from complex
sentences with a subject relative (The man who is tall is in the other room.),
a construction they do not yet produce and which occurs infrequently in
the input. There are infinitely many possible generalizations that are com-
patible with the simple yes/no question (e.g., front the leftmost auxiliary,
front the main clause auxiliary etc.). However, young children seem to only
entertain the structure-sensitive (and correct) one (front the main clause
auxiliary: Is the man who is in the other room tall?), not the others,
as they do not make mistakes of the type Is the man who in the other
room is tall.
While even very young infants readily generalize beyond the input,
their early production is not error-free. Interestingly, many of the errors
they make also provide evidence for the application of abstract rules: chil-
dren often overgeneralize. Forms such as *goed (instead of went) are not un-
common. Since these forms are not produced by adults, and are thus absent
form the input, they provide clear evidence for the existence of abstract
rules in children’s early grammars. Young children’s multiword speech thus
provides evidence for abstract representations in production from the tod-
dler years onwards. Can we find even earlier evidence? Since there is no
considerable production before this age, we need to turn to perception and
consider whether infants’ speech perception and language learning abilities
provide any cues. The artificial grammar learning paradigm was adapted
to infants with this purpose.
4.2.3. Artificial grammars: a central paradigm
Originally created to study implicit sequence learning (Reber 1967; 1969),
the artificial grammar learning paradigm was adapted to investigate lan-
guage learning in adults and infants. In this paradigm, a set of rules are
defined over a vocabulary of typically nonsense (or a mix of nonsense and
existent) words. Learners are exposed to grammatical strings generated by
(some of) the rules of the artificial grammar, and are tested on the learned
strings, new grammatical strings (generalization) and/or new ungrammat-
ical strings. This paradigm allows researchers to have more control over the
stimulus material than if they used stimuli from a natural language, and
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they can, to a large extent, reduce the effects of experience. This paradigm
is thus suitable to emulate language acquisition in adult learners and it is
also attractive to investigate early language acquisition, because the stim-
ulus material can be simplified to make up for infants’ attentional and
memory limitations.
This paradigm has been widely used (for reviews, see Gomez & Gerken
2000; Gervain et al. 2018) to study statistical learning, lexical acquisition,
as well as the acquisition of morphological, syntactic and semantic reg-
ularities in infants and young children (e.g., Saffran et al. 1996; Marcus
et al. 1999; Dawson & Gerken 2009; Gomez & Gerken 1999; Marchetto &
Bonatti 2015).
A seminal artificial grammar learning study (Marcus et al. 1999)
aimed to show that very young infants are able to learn abstract, “al-
gebraic” rules, i.e., rules containing variables. The identity relation was
chosen as the target rule as it is the simplest abstract relation possible.
Infants were trained on a grammar generating three-word strings with two
identical and one different item (ABB, AAB or ABA), and they were
tested on their ability to discriminate the trained grammar from the other
grammars. For instance, infants familiarized with AAB sequences were
tested with new AAB sequences, i.e., sequences consistent with the gram-
mar of familiarization, as well as on ABA sequences, inconsistent with the
familiarization grammar. Infants discriminated the inconsistent sequences
from the consistent ones. Importantly, infants showed discrimination for
sequences made up of words that were not presented during familiariza-
tion (e.g., if familiarization items were “ba po ba”, “ko ga ko”, “ba ba po”,
“ko ko ga”, test items were “wo fe fe”, etc.). This way, it could be shown
that infants generalize the underlying abstract rule, rather than relying
on item-based information, e.g., statistics (frequency of occurrence or co-
occurrence, etc.) or the specific position of a given string element.
These initial results gave rise to a large body of literature further inves-
tigating how infants process, learn and represent identity-based structures,
whether this processing is specific to the language domain and to what ex-
tent it can be considered abstract (Marcus et al. 2007; Dawson & Gerken
2009; Saffran et al. 2007; Frank et al. 2009; Johnson et al. 2009). Most im-
portantly for our purposes, the interpretation that these simple repetition-
based structures are represented as algebraic rules was questioned. It has
been argued that adjacent repetitions are salient, Gestalt-like primitives,
which may be detected automatically by the perceptual system without
recourse to symbols or abstract representations (Endress et al. 2009). How-
ever, even if the detection of identity/repetition is a primitive, explaining
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the ability to discriminate adjacent repetitions (ABB) from non-adjacent
ones (ABA, as in Marcus et al. 1999) or random sequences (ABC, as in
Gervain et al. 2008; Gervain & Werker 2012), this account cannot explain
how infants discriminate between two adjacent repetition based structures,
such as AAB vs. ABB, an ability observed in 7-month-olds (Marcus et al.
1999) and newborns (Gervain et al. 2012). This is because discriminating
AAB and ABB structures requires the combination of repetition detection
with sequential ordering (initial vs. final position of the repetition).
Artificial grammar learning is thus a paradigm that has proven par-
ticularly useful in exploring the nature of infants’ knowledge and represen-
tations of language structure.
4.2.4. Bootstrapping approaches to the acquisition of grammar
The above-presented empirical results probe the acquisition of specific as-
pects of grammar and vocabulary. But how do they scale up to explain
the complex process of language acquisition? As discussed above, the P&P
paradigm provides a general approach to explain language acquisition uni-
versally across all languages. However, the linking problem arises (Pinker
1984): how do infants know what cues in the input to pay attention to in
order to set a given parameter? Bootstrapping mechanisms rely on the as-
sumption that infants can organize their linguistic knowledge by analysing
the perceptually available cues present in the input that, in turn, correlate
with the underlying linguistic structure.
Pinker (1984) was one of the first to introduce the notion of “boot-
strapping”. He argued for an innate correspondence between semantics and
syntax. According to his semantic bootstrapping hypothesis, the basic se-
mantic notions present in our every-day life (e.g., “actions” or “concrete
objects”) can be linked to syntactic or lexical categories (e.g., “verbs” and
“nouns”). Infants may rely on this innately specified knowledge to expect
nouns to refer to objects, and verbs to refer to actions. By observing the
contingency between specific words and their meanings, infants might be
able to link semantic information to the syntactic structure of a sentence
(linking rules).
Others have argued that this semantic bootstrapping is not always
possible, as infants would need to be able to process sentence structure
to begin with in order to be able to establish the correspondence with
semantics. The syntactic bootstrapping hypothesis (Gleitman 1990) pro-
poses that learning goes the other way: it is by observing the syntactic
structure that infants may deduce knowledge of the meaning. Specifically,
this procedure “deduces the word meanings from the semantically relevant
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syntactic structures associated with a verb in input utterances” (ibid., 30).
For instance, a transitive verb is likely interpreted as an action performed
by an agent on an object (e.g., he sent a letter), whereas an intransitive
verb is more typically an action performed by an agent with no object
involved (e.g., she was laughing). Using this regularity, infants may cate-
gorize a verb as transitive if it appears in the sentence with two nominal
arguments, but as intransitive if only one noun phrase is present. This
is a plausible learning mechanism to acquire verbs, because infants learn
nouns earlier than verbs. Indeed, infants’ first 50–100 words mainly consist
of nouns.
Importantly, infants are also sensitive to the acoustic information car-
ried by the speech stream from very early on. It has therefore been sug-
gested that prosodic and phonological cues contained in speech help infants
extract information about grammatical structure. The central argument of
the prosodic/phonological bootstrapping hypothesis (Gleitman & Wanner
1982; Nespor et al. 2008; Morgan & Demuth 1996) suggests that certain
acoustic/phonological properties of speech cue structural properties of syn-
tax. Variations in duration, intensity and pitch in the speech signal are
systematically related to the prosodic hierarchy, which in turn correlates
with the syntactic hierarchy of the sentence (Nespor & Vogel 1986; Selkirk
1984; Nespor et al. 2008). Therefore, these acoustic cues might help infants
parse speech into smaller, syntactically relevant units (Morgan & Demuth
1996; Christophe et al. 1997; 2003).
One domain in which prosodic bootstrapping has been well estab-
lished is the acquisition of word order. Languages of the world vary sys-
tematically in the relative order of their principal syntactic components
(Greenberg 1978; Dryer 1992), such as the Verb (V) and its Object (O)
and more generally functors and their corresponding content words. Im-
portantly from the point of view of language acquisition, the two possi-
ble word orders, VO/functor-initial and OV/functor-final, have different
prosodic and acoustic correlates (Nespor & Vogel 1986; Nespor et al. 2008;
Christophe et al. 2003; Gervain & Werker 2013). The phonological phrase
in VO languages (e.g., French, English and Italian) is characterized by
final prominence, marked by increased duration on the prominent item
as compared to the non-prominent item (e.g., to Ro:me). OV languages
(e.g., Turkish, Japanese and Basque), by contrast, are characterized by
initial prominence, marked by increased pitch or intensity on the promi-
nent as compared to the non-prominent element (e.g., Japanese: ˆTokyo
kara Tokyo from ‘from Tokyo’). Languages with different word orders thus
use different acoustic cues to mark prominence. Acoustic cues are readily
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available in the speech signal, and a well established auditory bias, known
as the Iambic–Trochaic Law (Hayes 1995), suggests that sound sequences
in which elements contrast in duration are naturally perceived as forming
units with an iambic, prominence-final pattern, while sequences in which
elements contrast in pitch or intensity are perceived trochaically, i.e., with
initial prominence. This correlates perfectly with the underlying prosodic
and syntactic structures, and thus offers infants a readily available, per-
ceptual, language-independent cue to word order, one of the most basic
properties of grammar. Experimental evidence has indeed demonstrated
that infants readily rely on this acoustic/prosodic cue. Newborn infants
show a preference for the acoustic pattern (iambic for durational contrasts
and trochaic for pitch/intensity contrasts) found in the language(s) heard
prenatally (Abboub et al. 2016) and they are also sensitive to the phono-
logical differences between functors and content words (Shi et al. 1999).
Infants between 6 and 12 weeks of age are able to distinguish between
the prosodic patterns of sentences in French, a VO language, and Turk-
ish, an OV language, on the basis of these acoustic differences alone, i.e.,
even when sentences are delexicalized by replacing all vowels with a schwa
and all consonants with a pre-defined member of their respective manner
of articulation category. Furthermore, 8-month-old OV-VO bilinguals can
use these acoustic cues to guide their choice of word order in an artificial
grammar task (Gervain & Werker 2013).
Another well-established cue that can be used in combination with
phrasal prosody to learn word order is word frequency, because prosodic
and word frequency information are aligned at the phrasal level. In VO lan-
guages, prosodic prominence falls on the final constituent of the phrase,
which is typically a content word, whereas its functors, which precede it,
are non-prominent. In OV languages, prominence also falls on the content
word, but in these languages content words tend to be phrase-initial. The
frequency-based bootstrapping hypothesis (Gervain et al. 2008; Bernard &
Gervain 2012) relies on the language universal division between functors
and content words (Chomsky 1995; Fukui 1986; Abney 1987). The two
classes differ in their frequency of occurrence. Individual functors have a
much higher frequency of occurrence than individual content words (Cut-
ler & Carter 1987; Kucera & Francis 1967; Gervain et al. 2008). Sensitivity
to this difference in word frequency distribution is detectable pre-lexically.
Eight-month-olds exposed to languages with opposite word orders, e.g.,
functor-initial Italian and functor-final Japanese, showed opposite prefer-
ences for word order in an artificial grammar task. Italian infants preferred
sequences starting with a frequent word, while Japanese infants preferred
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sequences starting with an infrequent word, mirroring the word orders of
these two languages (Gervain et al. 2008).
Word frequency is also used as a cue to establish the categories of
function and content words. Content words come in open classes (e.g.,
iPad, Brexit etc.), whereas functors constitute closed classes, into which
no new items can be added without a major language change. At 8 months,
infants treat frequent words as belonging to closed classes, accepting no
replacement for the frequent words in an artificial grammar, whereas they
process infrequent words as belonging to open classes readily accepting
substitutions with new items (Marino, Bernard, and Gervain under re-
view). As a confirmation, 17-month-old infants expect infrequent, but not
frequent words to have semantic content, serving as possible labels for ob-
jects (Hochmann et al. 2010). This further strengthens the claim that fre-
quency acts as a cue to true lexical categories. Interestingly, non-linguistic
animals (rats) are also sensitive to frequency information in a similar artifi-
cial grammar paradigm, but do not encode the relative position of frequent
and infrequent words (Toro et al. 2016).
The prosodic and frequency-based bootstrapping hypotheses are par-
ticularly attractive, because they provide perceptually based mechanisms
to explain how infants might start breaking into their native grammar(s)
very early, before and thus independently of the lexicon and implies the ex-
istence of a rudimentary representation of word order as early as 8 months
of age.
In sum, a substantial amount of empirical evidence has gathered sug-
gesting that young infants, even newborns, exhibit more sophisticated
speech perception and language learning abilities, as well as more knowl-
edge about the specific properties of their native language than behavior-
ist approaches prior to the cognitive turn would have predicted. Specific
mechanisms have been proposed to account for language acquisition cross-
linguistically in line with formal theories of language.
4.3. Comparative research
The evolution of language has received considerable attention (e.g., Bicker-
ton 2016; Pinker & Bloom 1990; Hauser et al. 2002; Christiansen & Kirby
2003), especially since the biological nature of language came to the fore-
front. Historical evidence in this domain is scare. In the last 15–20 years,
however, cross-species research directly comparing humans’ and animals’
performance in language learning tasks has provided invaluable insight into
the abilities we share with non-human animals, and those that are unique
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to humans, possibly to human language. This has been particularly pro-
ductive in the artificial grammar learning and neuroimaging domains, in
which adults, infants and animals can easily be compared, as no prior lin-
guistic knowledge is necessary to complete the experimental tasks. In a
seminal, but much debated paper, Hauser et al. (2002) suggested that the
only unique human evolutionary step towards language is the emergence
of the combinatorial operation (“merge” in the sense of Chomsky 1995),
underlying humans’ ability to entertain hierarchically embedded, recur-
sive representations, unavailable to non-human animals. They backed this
claim up with comparative artificial grammar learning data from monkeys
and humans (Fitch & Hauser 2004). Several subsequent publications sug-
gested that some animal species, e.g., songbirds, are able to learn centrally
embedded, recursive structures, similarly to humans (Gentner et al. 2006),
while others argued that in the original tasks, even humans did not nec-
essarily learn such complex structures (Hochmann et al. 2008). A large
amount of recent work (for a recent summary, see the special issue, Petkov
& Marslen-Wilson 2018) has used the same artificial grammar learning
paradigms as those used with infants to test whether animals are able
to extract identity-/repetition-based regularities (in primates: Rey et al.
2019; in song birds: Chen et al. 2015), non-adjacent dependencies (in pri-
mates: Malassis et al. 2018; Ravignani et al. 2013; Wilson et al. 2013) or
prosodic patterns (in rats: de la Mora et al. 2012; in song birds: Spierings
et al. 2017). The debate is still open as to whether animals have recursive
linguistic representations and about the level of the Chomsky hierarchy
that best characterizes their competence.
4.4. Neuroimaging studies
In the past decades, brain imaging techniques have revolutionized our
ability to explore the human brain. How the brain processes speech and
language has been investigated in thousands of electroencephalography
(EEG), magnetoencephalography (MEG), functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) and positron emission
tomography (PET) studies from birth to adulthood. The brain network
responsible for language processing is now quite well described in adults
(e.g., Friederici 2011; Poeppel 2014; Kutas and van Petten 1988; Basti-
aansen & Hagoort 2006) and its origins are starting to be understood in
infants (Dehaene-Lambertz et al. 2002; 2008; Gervain et al. 2011; Friederici
et al. 2007; Pena et al. 2003).
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While this technological development and knowledge of brain function
and anatomy it brought about are independent of the generative tradi-
tion, the relevance and interpretation of brain imaging data for language
sciences have definitively been influenced by the biological stance of the
generative enterprise. If language is an “organ”, brain imaging should allow
us to investigate it. Indeed, certain imaging studies were directly inspired
by linguistic theory and explicitly set out to find evidence for the neural
mechanisms encoding formal linguistic operations, such as merge or move,
and possible vs. impossible linguistic rules (Friederici et al. 2003; Friederici
& Frisch 2000; Musso et al. 2003). Thus, Musso and colleagues have shown
increased activation in Broca’s area when German-speakers syntactic rules
of Japanese or Italian, but no activation when the same Japanese or Ital-
ian words were used in rules that are not allowed by UG, such as counting
rules. Importantly for the issue of language development, evidence has been
found that the infant language network is already similar to the mature,
adult network. In particular, both the temporal, auditory areas and the
frontal regions, responsible for higher order structural or sequential pro-
cessing, are operational from birth (Dehaene-Lambertz et al. 2002; Pena
et al. 2003; Gervain et al. 2008). While many brain imaging studies were
unable to identify the neural correlates of different syntactic constructions
as posited by generative grammar, and even provided evidence against
generativist assumptions (Pulvermüller 1999; van Turennout et al. 1998;
Bastiaansen et al. 2010), the generativist quest for evidence in favor of the
mental and biological reality of these theoretical constructs bolstered the
idea that neuroimaging can directly inform language theory, and not just
investigations of brain function, anatomy or pathology.
5. The most recent perspective: integrative models
As summarized above, the nativist-empiricist (or “nature-nurture”) de-
bate dominated much of the second half on the 20th century as com-
peting paradigms in explaining the language faculty. As a result, we now
have a much better empirical understanding about how the human mind
and brain process and learn language. Very early language acquisition has
played a pivotal role in these debates, and much has been learned about
how babies break into language. Interestingly, the influence was recipro-
cal. Generative theory also changed as a result of empirical evidence, as
reviewed in Chomsky (2007). Specifically, research on language acquisition,
and in particular, the problem of learnability has given a strong push to-
Acta Linguistica Academica 66, 2019
Acta Linguistica Academica / p. 389 / September 15, 2019
Generative grammar and language acquisition 389
wards simpler syntactic formalism, which Chomsky’s Minimalist Program
(Chomsky 1995) made explicit.
These empirical observations, as well as recent advances in brain imag-
ing, genetics and epigenetics (Werker & Hensch 2015; Lewkowicz 2000),
have led to new theoretical questions and a more integrated view of in-
nate and learned abilities, rendering the strict nature-nurture dichotomy
obsolete.
The last decades of biological research have in fact proposed a new
model of how gene expression is regulated by inherent biological factors,
but also by experience. It has been proposed that DNA expression can be
modified during the entire life span of an individual through experience
and environmental factors. This up- or downregulation of DNA expression
is transmissible (e.g., during genome imprinting or embryonic stage), thus
these epigenetic re-arrangements change gene expression without chang-
ing the DNA sequences (Roth & Sweatt 2009). Epigenetics studies these
flexible re-arrangements of our genome. The human genome is no longer
considered exclusively as a “committed” blueprint, but rather as a “poten-
tiality”.
Epigenetic modulations of gene activity may be induced by environ-
mental factors such as diet, stress, exposure to certain chemical substances
and specific behavioral stimulations, e.g., extensive practice, sensory de-
privation etc. (e.g., Franklin & Mansuy 2010; Gräff & Mansuy 2008; Jirtle
& Skinner 2007; Liu et al. 2009; Roth & Sweatt 2009; Zhang & Meaney
2010). These modulations have most often been studied in animals. One
study has shown, for instance, that better quality infant-caregiver inter-
action (e.g., more time spent nursing) produces epigenetic modification
that impact the stability of gene expression in the central nervous system,
thereby modifying behavior (Roth & Sweatt 2009).
In this perspective, dynamic and complex interactions take place be-
tween the environment and the genome (Waddington 1942). These inter-
actions trigger epigenetic modulations as a response to the experience,
forming epigenetic “memories” of the external world. Since the earliest
stages of the development, environmental feedback is necessary to develop
optimal functioning. Behavioral outcomes are thus often mediated by the
long-term influence of these experiences.
This framework puts the notions of critical or sensitive periods and
brain plasticity into a new perspective (Werker & Hensch 2015). Differ-
ent aspects of language acquisition have different temporal windows of
opportunity. The critical periods of phonetic, lexical and syntactic learn-
ing are different (Kuhl 2010). This series of sensitive periods for language
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creates a cascading dynamics for language development, where each onto-
genetic accomplishment supports and interacts with the subsequent ones.
This epigenetic cascade “can be altered by sensory deprivation, pharmaco-
logical exposure and linguistic experience” (Werker & Hensch 2015, 187).
For instance, under specific circumstances such as deafness or exposure
to drug like serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SRI), the opening and closing
of the critical period is shifted (Weikum et al. 2012). In congenitally deaf
people, measures of acoustic discrimination indicate that plasticity stays
in place for a longer period than in normally hearing people (Faulkner &
Pisoni 2013; Kral & Sharma 2012). Also, untreated maternal depression
delays the closure of the sensitive period, while exposure to SRI (in infants
whose mothers are depressed, but medicated), accelerates it (Weikum et
al. 2012).
These advances show that both genetically endowed and environ-
mental factors play an important role, and the most important ques-
tion is to understand how they interact synergistically to enable human
development.
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